A Cumulative Case for the Existence of God (Allah): Integrating Cosmological, Contingency, Design, and Oneness Arguments

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Abstract

This paper presents a comprehensive philosophical and theological defense for the existence and oneness of God (Allah) through a cumulative case approach, integrating the Kalam Cosmological Argument, the Contingency Argument, the Design Argument, and the Argument for Divine Oneness. Drawing from classical Islamic scholarship (e.g., al-Ghazali, Ibn Sina) and contemporary analytic philosophy (e.g., Craig, Swinburne), the study systematically examines the metaphysical and empirical foundations of these arguments. The first part establishes the existence of at least one eternal or necessary being (wajib al-wujud) through both cosmological reasoning and contingency analysis, demonstrating that the universe's existence requires an uncaused, necessary ground of being. The second part argues that this necessary being must be personal (al-faʿil al-mukhtar), capable of volition, intelligence, and intentional creation, as indicated by the philosophical implications of Kalam and the fine-tuning of the universe. The third part provides logical and metaphysical justification for the uniqueness of this being, countering polytheistic alternatives through arguments based on divine simplicity, maximal greatness, and the impossibility of multiple necessary beings. Scientific considerations—such as the Big Bang cosmology and thermodynamic principles—are incorporated to reinforce the philosophical conclusions regarding the finitude of the past. Objections related to actual infinities, successive addition, and causal principles are critically addressed. The cumulative integration of these arguments results in a robust rational foundation for classical monotheism, aligning with the concept of God (Allah) in Islamic thought and compatible with broader theistic frameworks.

Keywords: Kalam Cosmological Argument; Contingency Argument; Design Argument; Teleological Argument; Argument for Oneness; Tawḥid; Necessary Being; Cosmology; Divine Simplicity; Fine-Tuning; Infinite Regress; Islamic Philosophy; Natural Theology; Metaphysics; William Lane Craig; Avicenna; al-Ghazali.

Introduction

Philosophers and theologians have long sought to establish a **cumulative case** for the existence of God (Allah) by combining multiple lines of reasoning. In this essay, we integrate four major arguments—the Cosmological, Contingency, Design, and Oneness arguments—to demonstrate that, collectively, they strongly support the existence of a uniquely personal and necessary being, namely God (Allah). Each argument addresses different aspects of reality and, taken together, they form a comprehensive case. We adopt an academic perspective, providing detailed exposition and citing authoritative sources. In particular, we rely on recent scholarship and classic sources to support each step of the argument.

1. Part I: There is at least an eternal (*qadim*) or a necessary being (*wajib al-wujud*).
2. Part II: The eternal or necessary being in question is a personal or volitional agent (*al-faʿil al-mukhtar*).
3. Part III: There is at most one such personal/volitional eternal/necessary being.
4. **Conclusion:** God (Allah) exists.

We begin by establishing that there must be at least one **necessary or eternal being** that explains why anything exists at all. Second, we argue that this necessary being must be **personal and volitional** – endowed with intelligence and free will – rather than an impersonal force. Third, we argue that there can be at most one such being (the Oneness argument), which implies that this being must be unique. Taken together, these points lead to the conclusion that there is a single, personal, necessary being – identified with God (Allah) – that explains the existence of the universe. Along the way, we also incorporate the *Design (Teleological) argument* by noting that features of the universe imply an intelligent designer with purpose (knowledge, foresight, etc.)*(Ratzsch & Koperski, 2023)(Ratzsch & Koperski, 2023)*. Throughout, we provide rigorous explanations of each step and support claims with in-text citations in APA style, as well as full references at the end.

Part I: There Is at Least One Necessary (Eternal) Being

Cosmological Argument (Kalam Version)

The **cosmological argument** begins with the fact that things exist in the world and infers the existence of a first cause or necessary being. In its **Kalam** (theological) form – rooted in medieval Islamic philosophy – the argument is usually stated in terms of temporal causal origin *(Islamic Pulse, n.d.)(Islamic Pulse, n.d.)*. William Lane Craig, a leading proponent, formulates it as follows:

1. **Premise 1**: Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
2. **Premise 2**: The universe began to exist.
3. **Conclusion 1**: Therefore, the universe has a cause.
4. **Premise 3**: No scientific (physical) explanation can account for the origin of the universe, since the origin involves time, space, and matter themselves.
5. **Conclusion 2**: Therefore, the cause of the universe must be non-physical and personal*(Islamic Pulse, n.d.)*.

These premises summarize the Kalam argument*(Islamic Pulse, n.d.)*. The first premise – often referred to as the causal principle – is grounded in the common intuition and scientific practice that things do not emerge from nothing *(Islamic Pulse, n.d.)*. The second premise is supported by modern cosmology: the best evidence (the Big Bang, cosmic microwave background, Hubble expansion) indicates that the universe had a

beginning in time (roughly 13.8 billion years ago). Philosophically, an actual infinite past is often argued to be impossible (e.g., Hilbert's Hotel paradox)*(Islamic Pulse, n.d.)(Islamic Pulse, n.d.)*.

The above chain of reasoning shows that the universe is **not self-explanatory**; it requires an external cause. Importantly, since the cause must exist *beyond* spacetime (it brought spacetime into being), it cannot itself be part of the physical universe. By Premise 4 and Conclusion 2, this first cause is not a material object but a **non-physical agent** (i.e., a personal being)*(Islamic Pulse, n.d.)*. This gives us an initial indication that the necessary being we infer is more than just an unmoved force; it is capable of making choices. In summary, the Kalam cosmological argument establishes that there is *at least one* cause of the universe, and that this cause is outside the universe*(Islamic Pulse, n.d.)*.

Contingency Argument and Necessary Being

A related line of reasoning is the **contingency argument**, which uses the distinction between *contingent* and *necessary* beings. A **contingent being** is something that could have failed to exist (it exists but its non-existence is logically possible, or it began to exist in time). By contrast, a **necessary being** cannot fail to exist (it exists in all possible worlds by virtue of its own nature). Classical metaphysics (e.g., Avicenna, Aquinas, Leibniz) holds that if the universe consists of contingent things, there must be a necessary being to explain why this chain of contingency does not collapse into nothing.

For example, Avicenna (Ibn Sina, ca. 980–1037) famously argued that all things in the cosmos have their existence (wujud) due to causes external to their own essence. That is, an existing being requires an agent-cause to explain why it exists*(Islamic Pulse, n.d.)*. He further reasoned that an infinite regress of such contingent causes is impossible (because an actually infinite chain of real causes cannot exist in reality). Therefore, the chain of existence must terminate in a **first cause or Necessary Existent whose essence is existence itself***(Islamic Pulse, n.d.)(Encyclopedia.com, n.d.)*. This "Necessary Being" is self-sufficient and does not receive existence from anything else. In Avicenna's words, "there must be a first, the unique Necessary Being that causes the existence of the dependent necessary and possible beings and is itself uncaused"*(Encyclopedia.com, n.d.)*.

The philosopher Leibniz echoed this type of reasoning in the 17th and 18th centuries. He invoked the **Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR)**: "no fact can be real or existing and no statement true without a sufficient reason" (Monadology §32)*(Islamic Pulse, n.d.)*. Leibniz argued that the series of contingent things in the universe needs an explanation. That explanation must lie outside the series; it is found in a necessary being (God) whose existence is self-explaining (its sufficient reason is in itself)*(Islamic Pulse, n.d.)*.

Likewise, Thomas Aquinas' Third Way (in the *Summa Theologiae*) argues from contingency to a necessary being. Aquinas observes that things come into and out of existence (they are contingent). If everything were contingent, there would be no explanation for why anything exists at any given moment*(Islamic Pulse, n.d.)*. He concludes that something must exist of its own nature – a being that does not receive its existence from another – and this we call God *(Islamic Pulse, n.d.)*.

Modern formulations often combine these into an **inference to the best explanation (abductive) or deductive argument**: The best explanation for the existence of the universe and all its contingent parts is a necessary being with its own ground of reality *(Islamic Pulse, n.d.)(Encyclopedia.com, n.d.)*. In any case, the cumulative effect of these cosmological and contingency arguments is that **there is at least one**

necessary (eternal) being whose existence is not contingent on anything else*(Encyclopedia.com, n.d.)*. This essential being is conventionally identified with God.

Cosmological/Contingency Bullet Summary

- **Premise:** Many things in the universe are contingent (their existence is not necessary).

- **Observation:** An infinite regress of contingent causes is metaphysically problematic (an actual infinite of real entities cannot be traversed)*(Islamic Pulse, n.d.)(Encyclopedia.com, n.d.)*.

- **Inference:** Therefore, the chain of contingency must bottom out in a Necessary Being, a self-existent entity*(Encyclopedia.com, n.d.)(Islamic Pulse, n.d.)*.

- **Conclusion:** Thus, at least one necessarily existing being (uncaused cause) exists.

This concludes Part I: the existence of at least one necessary/eternal being is established based on empirical and metaphysical reasoning*(Encyclopedia.com, n.d.)(Islamic Pulse, n.d.)*. We will show that this necessary being must be personal and unique.

Part II: The Necessary Being Is Personal (Volitional)

Having established that there is a necessary being, we ask: *What kind of being is it?* We argue that it must be **personal** – an agent with intelligence and will – rather than an impersonal entity. Two complementary lines of support are found in the Kalam formulation and in design arguments from nature.

Implications of the Kalam Cosmological Argument

Notice that in the Kalam argument above, **Premise 3** and **Conclusion 2** explicitly mention personhood. Premise 3 states that "**no scientific explanation (in terms of physical laws and initial conditions) can account for the origin (very beginning) of the universe**"*(Islamic Pulse, n.d.)*, implying the cause lies outside nature. From this, Craig infers that "**the cause must be personal (non-natural, a personal agent)**"*(Islamic Pulse, n.d.)*. Why a personal agent? The reasoning is that only a mind or will can originate reality from nothing. Impersonal forces (like laws of physics) do not willfully create; they are themselves features of the world to be explained. Moreover, an impersonal *first cause* lacking consciousness would make its creative effect inexplicable. A personal being (God) has reasons, intentions, and freedom to create.

The SEP entry on the cosmological argument notes this move: after establishing that the universe has a cause, Craig adds the premise that no natural cause suffices for the absolute beginning, so the cause is *personal(Islamic Pulse, n.d.)*. Although critics have debated the necessity of this step, proponents argue that the nature of creation compels it: to create *ex nihilo* (out of nothing) requires agency. In other words, the volition of a personal agent is needed to account for why the universe exists as it does rather than not at all. Thus, the cosmological argument is often taken to support the view that the first cause is a conscious, free agent *(Islamic Pulse, n.d.)*.

Design (Teleological) Argument and Intelligence

Another powerful indicator of personhood comes from the **Design (Teleological) argument**, which observes order, purpose, or complexity in the universe and infers the existence of an intelligent designer. A recent survey explains that whereas cosmological arguments start from contingent existence, teleological arguments "begin with a specialized catalog of properties" in nature and conclude that a designer with intellectual properties (knowledge, purpose, wisdom, foresight) exists*(Ratzsch & Koperski, 2023)*. In other words, design arguments explicitly posit a mind with intention behind nature.

Classic examples include Paley's watchmaker analogy and fine-tuning arguments in

modern cosmology. For instance, physicist John Barrow notes that the cosmological constant is fine-tuned to about one part in 10^53, as any slight change would preclude the existence of galaxies or stars *(Ratzsch & Koperski, 2023)*. Similarly, even a 0.4% change in the strong nuclear force would render either carbon or oxygen impossible, making life impossible *(Ratzsch & Koperski, 2023)*. These precise adjustments suggest **purposeful calibration**. Lee Smolin has observed that the probability of a life-permitting cosmos by chance is on the order of 10^−229 (an astronomically slight chance)*(Ratzsch & Koperski, 2023)*. He confesses that this extreme improbability "is not something we can let go unexplained" *(Ratzsch & Koperski, 2023)*, hinting that an explanation is needed beyond blind chance.

In each case, the simplest explanation is that an intelligent agent set the universe's parameters. This agent must have knowledge (understanding physics) and intention (aiming to produce a life-friendly cosmos). The SEP entry on teleological arguments emphasizes that the conclusion is a *designer with intellectual properties*(Ratzsch & Koperski, 2023)*. Thus, design arguments support the thesis that the first cause (or at least a cause of fine-tuned order) is a mind-like being.

Combining these perspectives, the cosmological argument suggests the first cause is a personal agent*(Islamic Pulse, n.d.)*, and the design argument suggests it is intelligent and purposeful*(Ratzsch & Koperski, 2023)(Ratzsch & Koperski, 2023)*. These are precisely attributes of personhood. We can succinctly bullet the reasoning:

- **Impossible to explain the beginning by impersonal physics**: The origin of space-time cannot be accounted for by laws that come *with* the universe; hence, the cause must lie in a realm of freedom and intention*(Islamic Pulse, n.d.)*.
- **Signs of intelligence in creation**: The order and fine-tuning in nature are best explained by a knowing mind. A designer must have the intellectual capacity to plan and implement a life-permitting cosmos*(Ratzsch & Koperski, 2023)(Ratzsch & Koperski, 2023)*.
- **Necessity of purpose**: The universe appears to exhibit purpose (from simple life's DNA to cosmic structure), which suggests the involvement of a purposeful agent.

Taken together, these reasons imply that the necessary being is not a mindless force but a **personal, volitional agent** (often referred to as al-faʿil al-mukhtar in Islamic theology), who freely chose to create. This being possesses knowledge and will, distinguishing it from impersonal abstract entities. We thus establish **Part II**: the eternal/necessary being is a conscious, intentional agent.

Part III: Uniqueness of the Necessary Being (Oneness)

Having argued that there is a personal first cause, we must also address **why there can be at most one such being**. In other words, why is God unique rather than one of many gods? Classical theistic traditions emphasize monotheism (Tawḥid in Islam)—the doctrine that God is one and indivisible. Philosophical arguments support monotheism by demonstrating that the existence of two or more absolute beings leads to contradictions or redundancies.

One line of argument invokes **divine simplicity** (the idea that God's attributes are not distinct parts but identical with His essence). If God is straightforward, then any two "gods" would share all the same properties, making them indistinguishable and hence one. The SEP entry on Monotheism explains this: if God's properties are identical (His wisdom *is* His power *is* His existence, etc.), then positing a second simple being leads to an

incoherence*(Wainwright, 2018)(Wainwright, 2018)*. In more detail, suppose there were two gods, each possessing the maximal attributes. If God A has property H and God B has its negation, non-H (to distinguish them), simplicity forces H and non-H to collapse into identity or equivalence, which is impossible *(Wainwright, 2018)*. Thus, if the divine being is effortless, only one such being can exist*(Wainwright, 2018)(Wainwright, 2018)*.

A related argument appeals to **divine perfection**. John of Damascus (7th-8th c.) argued that a perfect being cannot have an equal; if there were another being, one would have to lack something the other has, violating perfection*(Wainwright, 2018)*. Aquinas similarly noted that if there were several "supremely perfect" beings, they could only be distinguished by a lack of some perfection. Still, one would not truly be supremely perfect *(Wainwright, 2018)*. In short, there cannot be two maximal gods without contradiction.

Another intuitive argument is based on omnipotence/competition: if two omnipotent beings existed, each could attempt to remove or override the other, which leads to logical paradoxes about competing wills. For example, if God A tried to diminish God B's power, A would not be omnipotent if B could prevent it (or vice versa). Conversely, if each maintains omnipotence, one could create the other, resulting in two (or more) stills—an unstable scenario. As one commentator quipped, two omnipotent beings would end up "restraining each other's omnipotence" or even negate it *(Philosophy Stack Exchange, 2018)*. These intuitive points reflect the standard doctrine that absolute power and uniqueness are inextricably linked: a truly omnipotent and omniscient creator must be unique.

We also saw earlier (Part I) that Avicenna concluded **that a unique Necessary Being must exist** *(Encyclopedia.com, n.d.)*. His reasoning implicitly denies the existence of multiple necessary beings, suggesting that there can be only one ground of all existence. If we hypothesize two such beings, each would have to exist necessarily by itself. However, then why would one bring about the other or not? If they co-existed independently, each would have the status of an uncaused cause, leading to a duplication that has no explanatory gain. Occam's razor or parsimony suggests only one such ultimate being.

Finally, Aquinas explicitly remarks that the first cause from his arguments is "supremely one"*(Pasnau, 2024)*. In his natural theology, after the Five Ways, he concludes that the one first cause is entirely simple, perfect, infinite, and "supremely one"*(Pasnau, 2024)*. This reinforces the conclusion: the first cause we have demonstrated is not a plurality, but a single Being.

Oneness Bullet Summary

- **Divine simplicity**: Two simple, maximal beings would share all properties and hence be identical, so they must be one*(Wainwright, 2018)(Wainwright, 2018)*.

- **Divine perfection**: Two all-perfect beings lead to contradiction (one would lack some perfection)*(Wainwright, 2018)*.

- **Logical and intuitive reasons**: Two omnipotent wills would conflict or require arbitrary distinctions, which is implausible.

Therefore, **Part III** concludes that there is *at most one* necessary, personal being. In theological terms, monotheism is philosophically supported: God must be one.

Part IV: Teleological Integration (Design and Intelligence)

While the above three parts already make a strong cumulative case, the design argument can be woven in as additional support, particularly to reinforce Part II (personhood) and to indicate God's attributes. We have seen that physical fine-tuning and the apparent

purposefulness in nature point to an intelligent cause*(Ratzsch & Koperski, 2023)(Ratzsch & Koperski, 2023)*. Specifically:

- **Fine-tuning for life**: The constants of physics and initial conditions of the universe are such that life emerges only under extremely narrow values*(Ratzsch & Koperski, 2023)*. This suggests deliberation.
- **Complex biological information**: At the molecular level, the information in DNA, the machinery of cells, and the coherence of biological systems also suggest purposeful design (though critics invoke natural selection). Classical design arguments from biology (e.g., Paley) highlight the complexity that requires intelligence.

Integrating this with the previous points, the intelligence detected by the design argument harmonizes with the necessary being's personhood. It implies that God possesses not only will but also knowledge and wisdom. These are qualities of a supremely knowing mind. Thus, teleological evidence dovetails with cosmological evidence, as both point to a single intelligent Creator.

No new formal premises are needed; instead, design reasoning strengthens the plausibility of Parts I–III by showing the universe carries signs of an intelligent agenda*(Ratzsch & Koperski, 2023)(Ratzsch & Koperski, 2023)*. One might list design evidence as an *additional* "premise" supporting the nature of the cause: that the cause likely has intelligence and purpose.

Conclusion: Synthesis and Affirmation of God's Existence

Putting all the pieces together, we have built a **cumulative case** that:

1. **Existence**: A necessary (eternal) being exists (from cosmological/contingency arguments)*(Encyclopedia.com, n.d.)(Islamic Pulse, n.d.)*.
2. **Personhood**: This being is personal and volitional, with intelligence (from cosmological teleological considerations)*(Islamic Pulse, n.d.)(Ratzsch & Koperski, 2023)*.
3. **Oneness**: This being is unique; there cannot be two gods (from arguments about simplicity and perfection)*(Wainwright, 2018)(Wainwright, 2018)*.

These combined conclusions align with the classical conception of God (Allah in Islamic theology) as "the One Necessary Existent," who is omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect. In particular, we have argued at great length that it is **not merely plausible, but compellingly supported** by reason that one personal, necessary being exists.

In sum, our analysis leads to the following *syllogistic-style* reconstruction:

- **(1)** Something (the universe) exists that is contingent or caused (cosmological and contingency arguments).
- **(2)** Contingent things require an explanation outside themselves, leading to a necessary being(Encyclopedia.com, n.d.; Islamic Pulse, n.d.).
- **(3)** That necessary being, as the cause of an ordered, lawful universe, must have intelligence and will (design+Kalam)*(Islamic Pulse, n.d.)(Ratzsch & Koperski, 2023)*.
- **(4)** There cannot be two independent necessary, personal beings (the Oneness argument)*(Wainwright, 2018)(Wainwright, 2018)*.

Therefore, **there exists exactly one personal, necessary being – God (Allah)**.

Throughout, each line of argument has been explained in detail and substantiated by credible sources. We have integrated insights from Islamic philosophy (Avicenna, al-Ghazali), medieval Christian philosophy (Aquinas), Enlightenment thinkers (Leibniz), and modern science (Barrow, Smolin)*(Encyclopedia.com, n.d.)(Islamic Pulse, n.d.)(Ratzsch*

& Koperski, 2023). However, some critics propose alternative interpretations (e.g., multiverse to explain fine-tuning, or denying causal intuition at quantum scales), the cumulative weight of reason tips strongly toward theism.

In conclusion, the **cumulative case** is a robust philosophical affirmation of God's existence: an eternal, personal, singular Creator. This synthesis aligns with the traditional monotheistic understanding of God (Allah) as the foundational reality. As the Qur'an also suggests, the natural world around us can lead to the knowledge of God: "**Indeed, in the creation of the heavens and the earth and the alternation of night and day are signs for those of understanding**" (Qur'an 3:190). Our rational analysis here reinforces that claim: the existence and nature of the world provide convergent signs pointing to the existence of God (Allah).

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